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The Bolsa Família Program is a Conditional Cash Transfer Program that was implemented in 
Brazil in 2003. Since the implementation of the program some of its effects were studied, but its 
effects on fertility decision has drawn a little attention. The objective of this paper is to evaluate if 
there is an impact of Bolsa Família Program in the fertility of beneficiaries. We use the Household 
Sample National Survey (PNAD) for the years 2004 and 2006 and estimate the first-differences for 
each  year,  to  find  the  average  treatment  effect  on  treated  (ATT).  To  find  comparable  groups  of 
treatment and control, we use Propensity Score Matching methods. We compared the ATT outcomes 
for  the  two  years  and  its  estimated  confidence  intervals  and  found  that  there  are  no  statistical 
differences between the ATT results in 2004 and 2006. 
 




O  Bolsa-Família  (BF)  é  um  programa  de  transferência  de  renda  condicional  (CCT) 
implementado no Brasil em 2003.  Desde sua implementação diversos estudos foram feitos sobre o 
programa em relação ao seu impacto sobre educação, saúde e oferta de trabalho, mas os efeitos do BF 
sobre a decisão de ter filhos teve pouca atenção dos pesquisadores. O objetivo desse trabalho é avaliar 
o impacto do BF sobre a fecundidade das famílias beneficiárias do programa. Nós usamos os dados da 
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra Domiciliar (PNAD) para os anos de 2004 e 2006 e estimamos as 
primeiras  diferenças  para  cada  um  dos  anos,  buscando  observar  o  efeito  médio  do  programa  nos 
beneficiários (ATT). Utilizamos a metodologia do escore de propensão para identifica os grupos de 
tratamento e controle, e comparamos os resultados do ATT para os dois anos. Os resultados indicam 
que não há impacto significativo do recebimento do BF na decisão de ter filhos  entre os beneficiários 
do programa.  
 
Palavras-chave: fecundidade, bolsa-família, escore de propensão, Brasil 
 




   
In recent decades a new format of social programs directed to poor families and individuals 
became very common in developing economies (Stecklov et al, 2006). Contrary to older programs that 
simply transferred money or goods to families based on a means-test, the newer programs condition 
money  transfers  to  a  specific  behavior.  These  programs,  known  as  Conditional  Cash  Transfer 
Programs  (CCT),  require  that  families  participate  in  health  and  educational  activities  in  order  to 
receive their monthly transfer. Their main objectives are the interruption of the intergeneration poverty 
transmission cycle, in the long-run, and poverty relief, in the short-run.  
  The emergency of these programs raised many questions for academics and policy makers 
regarding the indirect effects of the programs (Rawlings, 2004). However, many CCT programs have 
been  operating  for  many  years  and  producing  extremely  positive  results,  being  their  indirect  (or 
negative) effects – for example, on adult labor supply – generally low
1. Brazil is a good example of a 
recent  and  positive  CCT  program:  Bolsa  Família  was  implemented  in  2003  beneficiating 
approximately 3,6  million families below the  poverty  line,  reaching   11  million  families  in  2006 
(Santana, 2007; MDS, 2007).  
  Empirical evidences in several countries suggest that there is no significant impact of transfer 
programs on fertility. The evidence holds for different types of programs, including those that only 
provide  child-care,  the  traditional  cash  transfer  programs  and  income  tax  exemption  policies. 
(Gauthier e Hatzius, 1997; Acs, 1996; Whittington, Alm e Peters, 1990, apud Stecklov et al., 2006). 
Moreover, the impact of a transfer program to the fertility behavior is one of the oldest and most 
important demographic questions (Stecklov et al, 2006).  Surprisingly, despite being one of the main 
points made by the critics of the program, the impact of Bolsa Familia on fertility decisions in Brazil 
has drawn little attention (Rocha, 2010) 
  Classical economic models suggest that fertility decisions are based on individual choices, that 
individuals are rational and decide their fertility level maximizing household utility, considering the 
budget constraint. Becker and Lewis' (1973) model of demand for children, that considers the quality-
quantity trade-off, to make possible sundries results of the CCT programs, from the increase to the 
decrease in fertility,  depends  on  factors like  family’s preferences between quality and quantity of 
children and consumption of “other goods”, conditionality of the program, and other factors that could 
affect the costs of children (childbearing, quality and/or quantity costs). 
  Stecklov  et  al.  (2006)  investigate  three  developing  countries  in  Latin  America  and  find 
different outcomes for each one of them. In Mexico and Nicaragua, there were no significant impacts 
of cash transfers on beneficiary fertility, whereas in Honduras an increase of 2 to 4 percentage points 
in  the  fertility  of  beneficiaries  was  observed.  The  main  explanation  for  the  results  observed  in 
Honduras is that the program did not limit the number of recipients in each family; thus, a higher 
fertility meant more benefits (Stecklov et al., 2006). 
  Fertility rates in Brazil are declining rapidly, in less than four decades the total fertility rate 
dropped from 6 children per woman to about 2 children per women. Recent estimates from the 2006 
                                                    
1 Stecklov et al (2006), MDS (2007), Brière e Rawlings (2006). The Impact of Bolsa Família Program in the Beneficiary Fertility – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 439(2011) 
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Demographic and Health Surveys show a TFR of 1.8 children per women. However, there are huge 
regional  and  educational  differences  in  fertility.  Rios-Neto  (2005)  shows  that  the  TFR  for  better 
educated  women  is  about  3  times  lower  than  the  one  observed  in  the  less  educated  groups. The 
objective of this paper is to estimate Bolsa Familia’s impact on the fertility of beneficiaries in 2004 
and 2006. In this way, we contribute by providing a base on which to found complementary policies 
for mitigating an adverse incentive, if it exists, or by reinforcing the validity of the program, if it does 
not. 
In order to identify beneficiaries of Bolsa Família we use the National Household Sample 
Survey (PNAD), carried out annually by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), 
since  1971,  except  in  Population  Censuses  years  (1970,  1980,  1991  and  2000).  PNAD  collects 
information on education, labor, income and housing. Each year, a special supplement is also included 
in the survey.  Questions about the beneficiaries of Bolsa Família were included in 2004 and 2006, 
making it possible to identify in the survey the program's beneficiaries.  
The estimation of the impact of Bolsa Família on the fertility of beneficiaries was done using a 
regression model based on the First-Differences approach for each year. After, we compared if the 
outcomes for 2004 and 2006 are statistically different. Unfortunately, we do not have information for 
the same group of people before and after the implementation of the survey. In the program to find 
comparable groups – treated and control – we use Propensity Score Matching methods.  
The matching estimations from both years were done restricting the beneficiary’s sample to 
reproductive women (15 up to 50 years old) that have low income (with values close
2 to the minimum 
wage in Brazil), and the parameters used were selected taking into account the selection criteria for the 
program, such as poverty characteristics, as well as characteristics of individuals, as age, race and 
others.  
Results point to a positive impact of Bolsa Família on the fertility of beneficiaries, albeit of 
almost negligible value. However, results for first-differences estimations for both years show that 
there is a considerable and significant difference in the fertility of control and treatment groups, since 
women in the latter had a smaller probability of having had a child in the previous year. We have to 
point that the results are influenced by the chosen method, and this is an important issue.  
 
 
2. THE BOLSA FAMÍLIA PROGRAM AND ITS POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON THE FERTILITY 
OF BENEFICIARIES  
 
2.1. The design of Bolsa Família 
 
Since the  middle of the 1990’s, there  have been in Brazil social programs based  on  cash 
transfers to poor families that have children in scholar age, if these children attend school. The first of 
these programs was called Bolsa Escola and began in 1995, in Campinas, a city of the state of São 
                                                    
2 The minimum wage in Brasil in 2004 and 2006 was, respectively, R$260,00 and R$350,00. In order to expand our 
beneficiaries' survey we selected for these years samples with limit-values of R$300,00 and R$400,00, which correspond 
to about 96% of the beneficiaries identified in the PNAD survey each year.  The Impact of Bolsa Família Program in the Beneficiary Fertility – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 439(2011) 
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Paulo, and was adopted in several other districts of the country, being transformed into a national 
program under the federal government's supervision in 2001. The main objective of Bolsa Escola was 
to  incentivize  scholar  attendance  by  poor  children,  under  the  assumption  that  they  leave  school 
because they need to work in order to complement family income. 
The Bolsa Familia program began in 2003, uniting some pre-existing social programs that 
were directed at poor  families, like Bolsa Escola and  others that  focused  not  only  on those  with 
children. In such way, through just one benefit, there would be provided a monthly minimum income 
of R$50.00 (about US$ 21) to families below the poverty line, which is R$50,00 per capita. Moreover, 
there would also be given an additional benefit to each pregnant woman, child at low age or child at 
scholar age.  As it was previously stated, initially, in 2003, Bolsa Família benefited about 3.6 million 
poor families in Brazil, reaching 11 million in 2006, which shows the rising coverage of the program. 
  The design of Bolsa Família, however, like its management mechanisms, underwent some 
changes. In 2007 a single register of social programs was created, called CadÚnico, an instrument to 
collect data and information in order to identify all poor families in Brazil. The register is composed of 
information about  household characteristics,  family composition,  family members' schooling, their 
professional skills and job market status. It can be used in all government spheres to identify targets of 
social  programs, thereby  avoiding  the superposition  of  benefits  to  the  same  family.  Furthermore, 
another change in Bolsa Família’s design was a measure, announced on January 2008, that enlarges 
the coverage of the program in order to include poor young people between 16 and 17 years of age 
who attend school regularly.  
  The current design of Bolsa Família considers an income of R$60,00 to R$120,00 per capita 
for  selecting  poor  families  and  incomes  below  R$60,00  per  capita  for  extremely  poor  families. 
Families  with  the  lowest  incomes  have  priority,  which  is  checked  through  information  from 
CadÚnico.  The  program’s  conditionalities  include  children’s  (and,  now,  the  youth’s)  school 
attendance and the fulfillment of basic health care. The lowest school attendance accepted is 85% of 
the total, while health conditionalities are the attendance of medical consultations in pre and postnatal 
periods  for pregnant  women,  complete vaccination  for  children below 7 years old  and nutritional 
attendance for both. Extremely poor families receive a basic benefit, increased of variable benefits 
according to the family’s composition, as explained above. The composition of benefits in 2004 and 




Composition of the benefits of Bolsa Família Program 
 
Eligibility criteria  Children between 









Situation of the 
family 
Household 
income per capita 
Poverty 
Between R$ 
60,01 and  
R$ 120,00  
1 Member  (1) Variable  18,00  
2 Members  (2) Variable  36,00  
3 or + Members  (3) Variable  54,00  
Extreme-poverty  Up to R$ 60,00  
Sem ocorrência  Basic  58,00  
1 Member  Basic + (1) 
Variable  76,00 
2 Members  Basic + (2) 
Variable  94,00 
3 or + Members  Basic + (3) 
Variable  112,00 
          Font: Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (MDS), 2007 
   
 
Beyond the benefits shown in the table above, since the beginning of 2008 beneficiaries can 
receive the Youth Variable Benefit (BVJ), as already explained. The limit of beneficiaries for each 
household is of 3 members among pregnant women and children below 15 years old, and 2 members 
of 16 or 17 years old in the case of BVJ. This way, the most vulnerable families can receive up to 
R$172.00 monthly (about US$72).  
  Moreover, there is a benefit given to families that were attended by other programs besides 
Bolsa Família and to which the migration to the program brought about monetary losses. This benefit, 
called  Extraordinary  Variable Benefit  (BVCE),  has  an  expiration  date  established and  its  amount 
varies in each case. 
The benefits in Bolsa Família, as in other programs of the same format, are preferentially 
given to women. This preference is based on researches that point to female altruism, directed to the 
welfare of all family members. (MDS, 2007) 
 
 
2.2. How could Bolsa Família affect the fertility of beneficiaries? 
 
As previously shown, some particularities of CCT programs can lead to adverse incentives on 
the fertility of beneficiaries. In this subsection we try to relate the implementation design of Bolsa 
Família to Economics of fertility, in order to demonstrate under what aspects the program could lead 
to an increase in the fertility of beneficiaries.  
 
2.2.1. Demand and supply of children 
 
Becker and Lewis (1973) used a microeconomic approach to explain the demand for children 
as the decision of a family, in which the utility function of the family depends on the number and on 
the  quality  of  children  chosen  and  on  consumption  of  other  goods,  given  the  simplified  family’s 
budget constraint. An important point of the model is that the shadow price of children with respect to The Impact of Bolsa Família Program in the Beneficiary Fertility – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 439(2011) 
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number is positively related to the number of children, leading to the result that an increase in quality 
is more expensive if there are more children, since the increase has to apply to more units. Similarly, 
an increase in quantity is more expensive if children are of higher quality, because higher-quality 
children cost more. Therefore, a positive shock on family income will lead to a larger increase in the 
consumption of other goods consumption than in quantity or quality. Thus, the receipt of benefits from 
conditional cash transfer programs would have a bigger impact on consumption of other goods than on 
the fertility of beneficiaries.  
According to Stecklov et al (2006), if children are normal goods, the sum of the income-
elasticities  of  quantity  and  quality  must  be  positive.  However,  the  Becker  and  Lewis  model’s 
specification leads to the possibility that the income-elasticity of quantity is negative. The income-
elasticity of quality would thus need to be sufficiently positive in order for the sum to remain positive. 
Hence, if the CCT’s transfers are unconditional, a reduction of the demand for children accompanied 
by a rise in quality could happen, depending on the family’s preferences. However, if transfers are 
linked to family’s behavior and to the health and schooling of children, the benefit's effect is to reduce 
children’s price, which leads to other results. 
If there is in the family a “public good” or a “family’s good”, as books and clothes that can be 
used by all the children, or, in the CCT’s case, the mother’s knowledge about hygiene or contraceptive 
and prenatal methods, an exogenous improvement of contraceptive methods (or of the access to them) 
can lead to  an  increase  of the  quality  chosen  to  children, if quality  and quantity  are substitutes. 
Furthermore, children’s cost is connected to the mother’s wage in the labor market, since the higher 
the latter is, the higher will be the monetary loss of the mother if she chooses to stay home taking care 
of her children instead of working. This can also affect the number of children. 
As it was said by Stecklov et al (2006), relative to conditionalities of CCTs, the mother’s 
education about health and hygiene is a “familiar public good” that can reduce the cost of quality, 
while payments and assistance during pregnancy can decrease the cost of quantity. Health and school 
attendance can further reduce the  cost  of  children. The final  effect of CCTs on  fertility behavior, 
however, depends on specificities of the program and its conditions are directly relative to these costs.  
Other factors can influence the decision between quality and quantity of children relatively to 
the mothers’ job. If the quality of children is positively correlated to the time spent by mothers to take 
care of them, the choice of more quality will necessarily lead to less time in the labor market, leading 
to a proportionately lower wage. For this reason, CCT’s benefits can make mothers need to dedicate 
less time to work in order to win the same income, dedicating more time to children, and consequently 
choosing a higher quality to them, which, considering the quality-quantity trade-off, leads to lower 
fertility.   
Furthermore, fertility decisions can generate externalities that involve what is called “strategic 
complementariness” (Cooper e John, 1988, apud Sartoris e Souza, 2004). That means that the utility 
function depends on the total number of children in the community and that the utility of one aditional 
children  will  be  higher the  higher  is the  neighbors’  number  of  children.  In  CCTs programs,  this 
externality  could  provoke  an  increase  of  fertility among  neighbors  of  beneficiaries  that  were  not 
selected to the programs, if the selection was done through proxy means test. Thus, the inclusion of The Impact of Bolsa Família Program in the Beneficiary Fertility – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 439(2011) 
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one more member in the family, maintaining the income constant, would lead to a reduction of income 
per  capita,  raising  their  probability  of  inclusion.  Clearly,  this  will  depend  on  these  neighbors’ 
expectations relative to the growth of the program or on the list of beneficiaries being opened or 
closed. In this way, a “contamination” of the beneficiaries’ neighbors that are not benefited can occur, 
increasing their fertility. 
Stecklov et al (2006) also point, on this issue, to the necessity of a model that takes into 
account the supply of children, since CCT programs include interventions, such as family planning 
and health and nutrition information, which can influence biological supply of children. This effect 
can be analyzed through the model of fertility control presented by Rosenzwieg e Schultz (1985, apud 
Stecklov et al, 2006), that considers the number of children as an exogenous variable and assumes that 
fertility is a random variable that can be reduced by the use of fertility control.  
According  to  the  model,  through  the  supply  of  information  about  family  planning,  CCT 
programs  can  reduce  the  costs  of  that  planning  or  improve  the  control’s  efficiency,  what  could 
conduce to a decrease of fertility. Furthermore, CCTs can influence children supply, affecting the 
specific fertility of the couple by improving the nutritional status, for example. Moreover, the supply 
of information about breast-feeding benefits, included in health and nutrition conditionality, can rise 
the period of breast-feeding, affecting fertility negatively (Bongaarts, 1982, apud Stecklov et al, 2006).  
Another important issue that can affect the supply of children are the changes in the migratory 
pattern, since transfers can reduce the necessity of migration of poor people that search for better life 
conditions.  Not  migrating,  the  frequency  of  the  couple's  sexual  relations  may  rise,  leading  to  an 
increase of fertility. 
 
2.2.2. The possible effects of Bolsa Família 
 
The Bolsa Família program pays health, nutritional and educational benefits together, so that it 
is not possible to distinguish clearly which benefit can impact the fertility decision of beneficiaries. In 
another way, the CCT’s analyzed by Stecklov et al (2006) pay health and educational benefits apart, 
making it possible to distinguish these effects. 
Extremely poor families in Bolsa Família, contrary to poor families, receive a fixed benefit 
(R$58 in 2007), but this transfer does not have impact on beneficiary’s fertility, because it has a fixed 
value  and  is  independent  of  household  composition.  Furthermore,  it  is  a  benefit  unlinked  to 
conditionalities,  which  translates  its  impact  into  a  simple  income  effect,  not  changing  prices  of 
components  of  family’s  utility  function  (n,  q  and  y).  Thus,  pure  income  growth  should  increase 
consumption of all goods, and if children are normal goods, considering the quality-quantity trade-off, 
that  benefit  can  increase  consumption  of  other  goods  as  well  as  of  nq.  However,  that  does  not 
immediately  mean  an  increase  of  fertility,  but  rather  the  possibility  of  growth  in  the  number  of 
children (fertility) or in their quality, which depends on preferences and on the social context of the 
family. 
The benefit that can be an incentive to fertility of sorts is the variable benefit, which is paid to 
poor or extremely poor families and whose value varies according to the number of members between The Impact of Bolsa Família Program in the Beneficiary Fertility – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 439(2011) 
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0 and 15 years old and pregnant women. There is also the BVJ given to young people that are 16 or 17 
years old, given that they attend school, and whose value is larger than the common variable benefit 
(R$30 and R$18 per person, respectively). The existence of a limit of 3 people for the number of 
common variable benefits in each household could be a way to prevent immediate incentives to an 
increase in beneficiaries’ fertility. However, in those households that had less than 3 eligible members 
for  this  benefit  before  receiving  the  transfers,  this  incentive  may  occur  due  to  the  possibility  of 
inclusion of new beneficiaries (opened list) and the consequent increase in the amount received.  
The rise of Bolsa Família’s coverage in order to include young people done through BVJ is 
also a possible incentive to fertility, since BVJ's limit is unlinked to the common variable benefit limit. 
This enables the inclusion of a new pregnant woman and consequently a new child as a beneficiary. In 
another  way,  BVJ  can  discourage  fertility,  because  young  people  that  would  be  unlinked  to  the 
program  when  completing  16  years  old  will have  the  opportunity to  remain  in  the  beneficiaries’ 
condition, now receiving a higher value compared to the previous one (an increase of about 67%). 
Thus, what could lead to a decline in household income, now might lead to a raise of R$12, making a 
new beneficiary’s inclusion unnecessary to maintain the family’s budget. However, the final effect of 
BVJ in beneficiaries’ fertility can only be estimated within some years, due to the recent creation of 
this benefit.  
 
 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
   
We use the Household Sample National Survey (PNAD), carried out annually by the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), since 1971, except in Population Censuses years (1970, 
1980, 1991 and 2000). PNAD collects information on education, labor, income and housing. Each 
year, a special supplement is also included in the survey.  The survey included questions about the 
beneficiaries of Bolsa Família in 2004 and 2006.  
In 2004, the PNAD sample identified 24.338 (6,17% of sample) households benefited by the 
Bolsa Família program. The global number of benefited households in that year was about 4.550.469
3. 
In 2006, these numbers were respectively 87.800 (21,42% of the sample) and 11.118.074.  
In order to estimate the impact of Bolsa Família on the beneficiaries' fertility behavior, we use 
a regression model based on First-Differences approach. Unfortunately, we do not have information 
on the same group of people before and after the implementation of the survey. To find comparable 
groups – treatment and control – we use Propensity Score Matching methods.  
To evaluate the impact of a CCT program on the outcome variable (Y), which depends on 
treatment (D=1 if treated and D=0 if non-treated) and exogenous factors (X = control variables), the 
problem of evaluation is given by: 
 
Yi = a + bDi + cXi + Ui 
 
                                                    
3 MDS (2007) The Impact of Bolsa Família Program in the Beneficiary Fertility – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 439(2011) 
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Where Ui is the error term, “a”, “b” and “c” are parameters and the impact of treatment in the year of 
interest is given by “b”.  
However, a selection bias can exist if D and U are correlated. Therefore, to control this bias 
we must use in X the greatest number of observable characteristics that can affect the participation in 
the  program  and  the  outcomes  without  participation,  an  assumption  known  as  “Conditional 
Independence Assumption”. One of the conditions to meet it is that there are individuals in the control 
group with the same vector X as their relative treated units, i.e., the common support condition must 
be fulfilled. The estimation of propensity score solves this problem in our case, since the selection to 
the Bolsa Família Program was not randomized, due to the fact of the program being targeted on poor 
people, what makes it impossible to carry out experimental methods.  
The estimation of propensity score matches the probability of participation in the program: 
 
P(Xi) = Pr(Di=1|Xi) 
 
Assuming that, given X, participation is independent of outcomes, what means that if no bias 
give X then  no bias given P(X). In this way,  for each participant  we  can  find  a sample  of  non-
participants that have similar propensity scores, making it possible to compare the outcomes between 
the control and treated groups and to estimate the program’s impact. We did this for both years and 
compare the “b” outcome in 2004 from the one in 2006, analyzing if they are statistically different in 
order to say if the program has or not a positive impact in the fertility of beneficiaries.  
 
 
3.1. Characteristics of the sample of Bolsa Familia’s beneficiaries in the PNAD 
 
Most of the benefited households in both years were concentrated in the Northeast region 
(58,46% in 2004 and 53,46% in 2006) and in urban areas (68,55% in 2004 and 69,47% in 2006). 
About 96% of the households had up to R$300 (about US$ 130) of per capita income in 2004 and 
R$400 (about US$ 174) in 2006. These values were used as income limits for eligibility in each year, 
instead of the official income value, so as to expand the sample and produce more robust outcomes.  
Most families attended by Bolsa Família were composed by a couple with all children below 
14 years of age, in both years of analysis (41,34% in 2004 and 34,80% in 2006), followed by a couple 
with children below and above 14 years of age (27,10% and 27,36%, respectively), what shows that 
most of the beneficiaries had children living in the household. About 63,23% of the benefited women 
in reproductive age (15 to 50 years old) are between 15 and 35 years old in the 2004 sample, and 
58,33%  in  the  2006  sample.  The  average  number  of  children  living  with  their  mothers  in  the 
household was 2,54 in 2004 and 2,34 in 2006. The average years of schooling of the beneficiaries was 
4,14 in 2004 and 6,77 in 2006. 
Table 2 shows the percentage  distribution  of beneficiaries by  other  characteristics in  each 








Proportion of beneficiaries (%) - 
2004 
Proportion of beneficiaries (%) - 
2006 
Electricity  91,62  93,99 
Sewage disposal   31,56  32,12 
Access to clean water  25,47  24,26 
White  29,88  28,77 
Metropolitan area  27,71  23,08 
Formal labor market  17,51  20,89 
Woman head of family  4,68  5,40 
Font: PNAD 2004, 2006 
 
 
As we can se in Table 2, some characteristics related with poverty status are very similar 
between the analyzed years. Most of the benefited households had access to electricity, while only a 
minority had access to sewage disposal and clean water. The proportion of women as the head of the 
family was low, as well as the proportion of beneficiaries that participated in the formal labor market, 





With the purpose of doing the matching, we cut our sample in order to select just women in 
reproductive age (15 up to 50 years old) and up to the per capita income limits that reach about 96% of 
the sample's beneficiaries (R$300 in 2004 and R$400 in 2006). Logit models were estimated to find 
the probability  of participation on the program. The  dependent variable is a dummy  that assumes 
value=1 if women had a child in the previous year and value=0 if it had not. We used independent 
variables  that  affected  participation  in  Bolsa  Família,  based  on  CadÚnico  selection  criteria,  and 
variables  that  can  affect  outcomes,  as  shown  in  the  annexed  table.  We  use  the  nearest  neighbor 
matches method.  
 A lot of different estimations were done so that the Balancing Hypotheses would be satisfied, 
implying that the mean of each characteristic was not different between treatment and control groups. 
The best specifications  were chosen considering the number  of  observable  characteristics and the 




Logit model (1) (Bolsa Família, 2004) 
 
Variables  Coefficient  Standard 
error  z  P>z  95% Conf Interval 
White  -0,00541  0,095331  -0,06  0,955  -0,19225  0,181437 
Years of schooling  -0,01381  0,012874  -1,07  0,283  -0,03904  0,011421 
Number  of  children 
living in the household  0,135343  0,025702  5,27  0  0,084969  0,185717 
Southeast  0,359171  0,332828  1,08  0,281  -0,29316  1,011503 
North  0,106463  0,293884  0,36  0,717  -0,46954  0,682464 
Northeast  0,755147  0,285915  2,64  0,008  0,194765  1,31553 
Midwest  -0,35172  0,366806  -0,96  0,338  -1,07065  0,367203 
Urban area  -0,09047  0,092796  -0,97  0,33  -0,27235  0,091404 
Metropolitan area  0,068867  0,108606  0,63  0,526  -0,144  0,28173 
Age  -0,00192  0,005099  -0,38  0,707  -0,01191  0,008073 
Electricity  0,212592  0,132914  1,6  0,11  -0,04791  0,473099 
Sewage disposal  0,010109  0,045658  0,22  0,825  -0,07938  0,099597 
Woman head of family  -0,4153  0,14915  -2,78  0,005  -0,70763  -0,12297 
Access to clean water  0,031589  0,089623  0,35  0,724  -0,14407  0,207247 
Household  income  (per 
capita)  -0,00402  0,000828  -4,85  0  -0,00564  -0,0024 
Couple with children  0,512144  0,437065  1,17  0,241  -0,34449  1,368775 
Couple without children  -0,01763  0,52114  -0,03  0,973  -1,03905  1,003784 
Mother with children  0,784958  0,438084  1,79  0,073  -0,07367  1,643587 
constant  -2,66401  0,590135  -4,51  0  -3,82066  -1,50737 





Inferior bound, number of treated and number of controls for each block (Bolsa Família, 2004) 
 
Inferior of block of pscore 
Treatment 
Total 
0  1 
0,041653  1.037  90  1.127 
0,1  1.028  137  1.165 
0,15  851  183  1.034 
0,2  1.148  396  1.544 
0,4  19  6  25 
Total  4.083  812  4.895 
            Font: PNAD 2004 
 
 
As it was shown in table 3, variables related to poverty status generally have the expected 
signals. The number of children living in the household increases the probability of participation in the 
program, whereas greater household income per capita reduces the probability. The region with the 
largest probability of eligibility is Northeast, the poorest region in Brazil. Mothers with children also 
had a bigger probability  of participation. It is important to  note that the  fact that if  any  variable 
included in the model are not significant, this is not a problem. According to Rubin and Thomas 
(1996, apud Caliendo and Kopeining, 2005), a variable must be excluded from the model just if it is 
not appropriate.  The Impact of Bolsa Família Program in the Beneficiary Fertility – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 439(2011) 
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The matching for 2006 has one difference in independent variables if compared to 2004. To 
satisfy the Balancing Hypothesis we had to make a change in regional dummies, putting together the 
South and Southeast regions in order to create a new dummy with value=1 if the individual lives in 
one of these regions, and value=0 if she lives in the Northeast, North or Midwest regions. However, 
this is not a problem because socioeconomic characteristics are very similar in combined regions. The 




Logit model (2) (Bolsa Família, 2006) 
 
Variables  Coefficient  Standard 
error  z  P>z  95% Conf Interval 
White  0,061641  0,076899  0,8  0,423  -0,08908  0,212361 
Years of schooling  -0,03008  0,00996  -3,02  0,003  -0,0496  -0,01056 
Number  of  children 
living in the household  0,198833  0,024252  8,2  0  0,151301  0,246366 
South_Southeast  -0,25048  0,121099  -2,07  0,039  -0,48783  -0,01314 
Urban area  -0,29525  0,073739  -4  0  -0,43977  -0,15072 
Metropolitan area  -0,36453  0,088103  -4,14  0  -0,53721  -0,19185 
Age  0,024203  0,004014  6,03  0  0,016336  0,032071 
Electricity  0,526534  0,106594  4,94  0  0,317614  0,735454 
Sewage disposal  0,026105  0,034505  0,76  0,449  -0,04152  0,093734 
Woman head of family  -0,51167  0,105984  -4,83  0  -0,71939  -0,30394 
Access to clean water  0,153083  0,071968  2,13  0,033  0,012029  0,294137 
Household  income  (per 
capita)  -0,00402  0,00045  -8,93  0  -0,0049  -0,00313 
Couple with children  0,295597  0,251078  1,18  0,239  -0,19651  0,787701 
Couple without children  -0,52299  0,300138  -1,74  0,081  -1,11125  0,065272 
Mother with children  0,709302  0,253795  2,79  0,005  0,211873  1,206731 
_constant  -1,2491  0,333713  -3,74  0  -1,90316  -0,59503 




Inferior bound, number of treated and number of controls for each block (Bolsa Família, 2006) 
 
Inferior of block of pscore 
Treatment 
Total 
0  1 
0,065051  183  38  221 
0,2  316  98  414 
0,3  479  214  693 
0,4  493  446  939 
0,5  447  523  970 
0,6  350  848  1.198 
0,8  30  94  124 
Total  2.298  2.261  4.559 
                  Font: PNAD 2006 
 
 
Thus, like the results for 2004, variables generally have the expected signals in 2006 results. 
The  number  of  children living  in  the  household  increases  the  probability  of  being  a  beneficiary, 
whereas an  increasing household income per capita reduces the probability.  The same holds for a 
household that is located in urban and/or metropolitan areas. The regional dummy shows that families 
of the North, Northeast and Midwest regions have a bigger probability of eligibility that those of the 
South  and  Southeast  regions,  as  expected.  Mothers  with  children  had  a  bigger  probability  of 
participation, while couple without children had less probability. 
To certify the quality of the matching, we analyzed the means of the covariates before and 
after matching to verify if the differences between treatment and control groups were reduced. Tables 




Means of variables before and after matching (2004) 
 
    Mean  %reduct 
Variable  Sample  Treated  Control  %bias  bias 
Treatment 
 
Unmatched  1  0  .  . 
Matched  1  0  .  . 
White 
 
Unmatched  0,2266  0,22973  -0,7  -0,19 
Matched  0,2266  0,23153  -1,2  -57,3 
Years of schooling 
 
Unmatched  4,819  5,4032  -17,1  -4,35 
Matched  4,819  4,8744  -1,6  90,5 
Number of children living in the 
household  
Unmatched  2,8571  2,3143  31,8  8,44 
Matched  2,8571  2,7867  4,1  87 
North 
 
Unmatched  0,24877  0,37769  -28,1  -7,06 
Matched  0,24877  0,24163  1,6  94,5 
Northeast 
 
Unmatched  0,66133  0,47625  38  9,75 
Matched  0,66133  0,67586  -3  92,1 
Midwest 
 
Unmatched  0,02463  0,06641  -20,1  -4,61 
Matched  0,02463  0,02685  -1,1  94,7 
South 
 
Unmatched  0,01847  0,02813  -6,4  -1,57 
Matched  0,01847  0,01429  2,8  56,6 
Southeast 
 
Unmatched  0,0468  0,05152  -2,2  -0,56 
Matched  0,0468  0,04138  2,5  -14,6 
Urban area 
 
Unmatched  0,52833  0,58095  -10,6  -2,78 
Matched  0,52833  0,53276  -0,9  91,6 
Metropolitan area 
 
Unmatched  0,18719  0,19144  -1,1  -0,28 
Matched  0,18719  0,1899  -0,7  36,3 
Age 
 
Unmatched  32,933  32,63  3,4  0,87 
Matched  32,933  32,768  1,9  45,4 
Electricity 
 
Unmatched  0,88916  0,86835  6,4  1,62 
Matched  0,88916  0,88276  2  69,2 
Sewage disposal 
 
Unmatched  3,8941  3,8584  4  1,05 
Matched  3,8941  3,9042  -1,1  71,7 
Woman head of family 
 
Unmatched  0,12562  0,15741  -9,1  -2,31 
Matched  0,12562  0,12167  1,1  87,6 
Access to clean water 
 
Unmatched  0,31404  0,30867  1,2  0,3 
Matched  0,31404  0,32365  -2,1  -79 
Household income (per capita)  Unmatched  79,56  101,42  -39,5  -9,35 
Matched  79,56  79,198  0,7  98,3 
Couple with children 
 
Unmatched  0,75616  0,72182  7,8  2,01 
Matched  0,75616  0,75837  -0,5  93,5 
Couple without children 
 
Unmatched  0,01601  0,0468  -17,7  -4,02 
Matched  0,01601  0,01429  1  94,4 
Mother with children 
 
Unmatched  0,22044  0,21106  2,3  0,6 
Matched  0,22044  0,21921  0,3  86,9 
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The  results indicate  that  bias reduction  was  above  70%  in  all  cases,  indicating that  after 
matching  the  treatment  and  control  groups  are  very  similar,  when  considering  observable 
characteristics. This result indicates that the matching procedure was done properly and performed 




Means of variables before and after matching (2006) 
 
Variable    Mean  %reduct 
Sample  Treated  Control  %bias  bias 
Treatment  Unmatched  1  0  .  . 
Matched  1  0  .  . 
White  Unmatched  0,21274  0,22135  -2,1  -0,71 
Matched  0,21274  0,20885  0,9  54,8 
Years of schooling  Unmatched  5,1199  6,1606  -29,9  -10,1 
Matched  5,1199  5,0334  2,5  91,7 
Number of children living in the 
household  
Unmatched  2,7205  1,9232  50,2  16,96 
Matched  2,7205  2,7308  -0,7  98,7 
South_Southeast  Unmatched  0,0659  0,0855  -7,4  -2,5 
Matched  0,0659  0,0621  1,4  80,6 
Urban area  Unmatched  0,46572  0,57031  -21  -7,11 
Matched  0,46572  0,46687  -0,2  98,9 
Metropolitan area  Unmatched  0,14418  0,23481  -23,3  -7,86 
Matched  0,14418  0,141  0,8  96,5 
Age  Unmatched  33,761  31,843  21  7,07 
Matched  33,761  33,786  -0,3  98,7 
Electricity  Unmatched  0,89783  0,87891  6  2,03 
Matched  0,89783  0,88563  3,9  35,5 
Sewage disposal  Unmatched  3,8837  3,7917  9,7  3,27 
Matched  3,8837  3,8686  1,6  83,7 
Woman head of family  Unmatched  0,15657  0,18663  -8  -2,69 
Matched  0,15657  0,16648  -2,6  67 
Access to clean water  Unmatched  0,31667  0,30078  3,4  1,16 
Matched  0,31667  0,30995  1,5  57,7 
 
Household income (per capita) 
Unmatched  108,29  143,07  -43,8  -14,79 
Matched  108,29  107,18  1,4  96,8 
Couple with children  Unmatched  0,74082  0,68924  11,4  3,86 
Matched  0,74082  0,72525  3,5  69,8 
Couple without children  Unmatched  0,02034  0,07248  -25  -8,41 
Matched  0,02034  0,02371  -1,6  93,6 
Mother with children  Unmatched  0,22733  0,2092  4,4  1,48 
Matched  0,22733  0,23689  -2,3  47,3 
       Font: PNAD 2006 
 
 
The  results  for  2006 show that  the bias  was  reduced  by  more than 60%  for  most  of the 
observable variables, and that the matching was done properly. 
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3.3. The effect of Bolsa Família in the fertility of beneficiaries 
 
After evaluating the quality of the matching, we estimate the difference between treatment and 
control groups in each year in our dependent variable (If the woman had a child in the previews year), 





ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method (random draw version)/Bootstrapped standard 
errors – 2004 
 
treat.  contr.  ATT  Std.Err  t 
812  673  -0,063  0,026  -2,451 





ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method (random draw version)/Bootstrapped standard 
errors – 2006 
 
treat.  contr.  ATT  Std.Err  t 
2261  1066  -0,056  0,016  -3,457 
         Font: PNAD 2004 
 
 
Both ATT estimations were significant at 1% level. It is important to note that in both of the 
analyzed years the probability of a benefited woman having had a child in the previous year was 
smaller than that of the control group. In 2004, this probability was 6.3 percentage points smaller for 
the beneficiated group, while in 2006 this value was -5,6 percentage points. Considering signal and 
magnitude of ATT outcomes, we can note that the program has had a negative impact on the fertility 
of beneficiaries, despite this impact having been reduced between 2004 and 2006.  
The difference between the ATT outcomes of 2004 and 2006 (or the difference-in-difference) 
suggests that there is a positive impact – of 0,7 percentage points on the probability of a benefited 
woman having had a child in the previous year - of Bolsa Família Program on beneficiaries’ fertility. 
However, we cannot use the difference-in-differences approach, since that the sample are different 
between the years. 
In order to know if the impact of Bolsa Familia in the fertility of beneficiaries was positive or 
not in the analyzed period, since that the ATT results for first-differences estimations were significant 
at the 1% level and their magnitude was changed, we calculate the confidence interval to know if the 
values of the ATT’s estimated are statistically different. The 95% confidence interval for 2004 was 
between  -0,11396  and  -0,01204,  while  for  2006  the  value  was  between  -0,08736  and  -0,02464. 
Therefore, we cannot say that the ATT outcomes are statistically different between 2004 and 2006, 
since  the  confidence  intervals  are  coincident between  the  values  of  -0,08736 and  -0,02464, what 





We do not find any impact (negative nor positive) of Bolsa Família Program on the fertility of 
beneficiaries between 2004 and 2006. It is important to note that in both of the analyzed years the 
probability of a benefited woman having had a child in the previous year was smaller than that of the 
control group. In 2004, this probability was 6.3 percentage points smaller for the beneficiated group, 
what suggest that there is a pre-existent difference between control and treatment group. In 2006 this 
value  was  -5,6  percentage  points,  suggesting a  positive  impact  of  0,7  percentage  points  of Bolsa 
Família  in  the  fertility  of  beneficiaries  in  this  period.  However,  the  ATT’s  estimated  were  not 
statistically  different,  what  suggests  that  there  is  no  impact  of  Bolsa  Familia  program  in  the 
beneficiaries’ fertility. Os resultados são similares aos encontrados por Rocha (2010), que utiliza uma 
abordagem metodológica alternativa a apresentada nesse artigo.  Nevertheless, results presented in this 
paper are closely influenced by the chosen method, a fact that must be taken into account. In order to 
continue this work, is very recommendable to estimate using alternative methods and compare the 
results and its robustness.  
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Variables used in specification of models of propensity score 
White  Dummy: white individual  
Years of schooling  Years of schooling of the individual 
Number of children living in the household  Number of children living in the household with the 
mother 
Southeast, North, Northeast, Midwest, 
South_Southeast  Dummies for regions of the country 
Urban area  Dummy: Household located in an urban area 
Metropolitan area  Dummy: Household located in an metropolitan area 
Age  Age of the individual 
Electricity  Dummy: Household had access to electricity 
Sewage disposal  Dummy: Household had access to sewage disposal 
Woman head of family  Dummy: The woman is the head of family 
Access to clean water  Dummy: Household had access to clean water 
Household income (per capita)  Household income (per capita) 
Couple with children  Dummy: if the kind of family is a couple with children  
Couple without children  Dummy: if the kind of family is a couple without children 
Mother with children  Dummy: if the kind of family is a mother with children 
 